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Abstract. In this paper we show how to argue about agreements based on de-
pendence. First, we introduce a formal theory of arguing about agreements by
instantiating Dung’s abstract theory of argumentation with proposals for agree-
ments represented as dependence networks. Second, we show that acceptable
agreements are exchange based—satisfying the so-called do-ut-des principle—
and not redundant. Third, to further decrease the number of proposals, we define
a notion of minimal proposals. Roughly, all proposals can be split into a number
of minimal sub-proposals such that if the proposal is acceptable, then its minimal
sub-proposals are acceptable too. We show that minimal proposals satisfy the in-
decomposable do-ut-des property, i.e., they cannot be split into two nonempty
sub-proposals with at most one shared agent.
1 Introduction
Work in argumentation considers the problem of arguing about the formation of coali-
tions of agents [1, 11, 7, 8, 15], and reaching agreements [20, 3]. To the best of our
knowledge there is no argumentation theory based on the theory of dependence, as de-
veloped for example by Castelfranchi and colleagues [14, 33, 31]. However, such the-
ories are widely used to reach agreements among agents, for example in agreement
technologies [4].
Billhardt et al. [4] envision that methods and mechanisms from the fields of seman-
tic alignment, norms, organization, argumentation and negotiation, as well as trust and
reputation are part of a “sandbox” to build software systems based on a technology of
agreement. Starting with a well known definition of coordination as management of
dependencies between organizational activities [21], they distinguish the detection of
dependencies from taking a decision on which coordination action to apply. Their call-
by-agreement interaction method first establishes an agreement for action, and the ac-
tual enactment of the action is requested thereafter. The normative context determines
rules of the game, i.e. interaction patterns and additional restrictions. The so-called
Agreement Technologies (AT) tower1 of semantic alignment, norms, organization, ar-
gumentation, negotiation, trust and reputation is visualized in Figure 1.
1 http://bit.ly/HandbookAT
3 
Fig. 1. The AT tower [4] highlighting the layers we deal with.
Semantic technologies form the basis to deal with semantic mismatches and align-
ment of ontologies to give a common understanding of norms or agreements, defining
the set of possible agreements. Norms and organizations determine constraints that the
agreements, and the processes to reach them, have to satisfy. Organizational structures
define the capabilities of the roles and the power and authority relationships among
them. Argumentation and negotiation methods are used to make agents reach agree-
ments. The agents use trust mechanisms that summarize the history of agreements and
subsequent agreement executions in order to build long-term relationships between the
agents. Billhardt et al. emphasize that these methods should not be seen in isolation, as
they may well benefit from each other.
We are interested in the challenge of combining existing reasoning methods for
semantic alignment, norms, organizations, argumentation, and trust. This is where ab-
stract theories are promising. Dung [16] introduces abstraction in argumentation, which
is a very useful concept to combine reasoning using instantiation. For example, it has
been suggested that dependence networks can be seen as abstractions from BDI models
[5, 6]. We foresee that the logical framework for agreement technologies will lead to a
general framework of abstraction, refinement and instantiation of reasoning methods.
Research question: How to argue about dependence based agreements?
For argumentation we use the abstract theory of Dung [16], because it is a de facto
standard and its abstract nature makes it well suited to be combined with a theory of
agreements. The research question breaks down into the following sub-questions.
1. How to define the semantics of dependence networks as proposals for agreements?
2. How to discard proposals that will never be accepted?
3. How to restrict argumentation to minimal proposals without loosing possible agree-
ments?
For proposals we use a theory of dependence [14] representing power relations,
where the power of agent p over agent d is represented by the dependence of agent d on
agent p. Sauro [28] defines the do-ut-des property, based on a balance between the ad-
vantages and the burdens of the agents involved in a coalition, and the indecomposable
do-ut-des (i-dud) property taking into account also the costs and the risks deriving from
the coalition formation process. The modeling framework i* [33] and the software de-
velopment methodology Tropos [10] introduce three kinds of dependencies, for goals,
tasks and resources. We call them reasons.
A motivation for our work is the development of a theory of agreement technolo-
gies, where agreement-based coordination [4] is based on the management of depen-
dence [22]. The agreement technologies tower (Semantics, Norms, Organizations, Ar-
gumentation and Negotiation, Trust) clearly distinguishes between making proposals
for agreements and the arguing about these proposals to actually form agreements. The
layers of the stack are often addressed as independent issues. In this paper, we present
a first step towards the “unification” of the Argumentation and the Organization layers,
where dependence networks are used to represent proposals for agreements for agent
coalitions, fundamental to define a framework unifying all layers.
The aim of the paper is not argumentation-based negotiation [25], but it is to bridge
two layers of AT stack, and make advancements in dependence networks research. More
precisely, we start from dependence networks, which is a widely applied framework but
either not very formal, and we bring new insights from the theory (do-ut-des, i-dud)2 to
a level where it is easier to catch. Moreover, we do not just define these concepts, but
we provide argumentation theoretic foundations for them.
The assumptions we make in this paper are that the reasons are specific to the de-
pender agent, that we do not represent so-called AND-dependence, and that payoffs of
agents are sums of costs and benefits. These assumptions facilitate the presentation in
this paper, and the proofs of its results.
The layout of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the theory of abstract de-
pendence networks (Section 2), and then we show how to reason over acceptable and
minimal proposals for agreements (Section 3) by combining the theory of abstract de-
pendence networks with Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation. In Section 4 we de-
fine preferred, complete and grounded proposals.
2 Dependence theory
A dependence network is a social network, in which the relation among agents repre-
sents dependence.
2.1 Abstract dependence networks
Castelfranchi and colleagues [14, 31, 10] develop a theory of dependence networks, ap-
plicable to most social interactions. The abstract dependence networks we use in this
paper are directed graphs labeled with three kinds of reasons [33]: the fulfillments of
goals, the execution of tasks, and the production of resources. We follow Sauro [28] in
that every reason can occur only in the dependence relations of a single depender. In
contrast to Sauro, we represent only OR-dependence, no AND-dependence, such that
2 None of existing works on argumentation-based negotiation studied concepts like do-ut-des or
i-dud.
we do not consider jointly performed tasks, agents together fulfilling a goal, or together
providing a resource. In other words, we assume that tasks, goals and resources can be
performed, fulfilled or provided by a single agent.
Definition 1 (Abstract dependence network). An abstract dependence network N is
a tuple 〈S,R,D〉 where S and R are two disjoint sets (of agents and reasons, respec-
tively), and D ⊆ S × S ×R is a binary relation over agents for each reason such that
(d1, p1, r) and (d2, p2, r) implies d1 = d2. If (d, p, r) ∈ D, then we say that agent d
depends on agent p for reason r, or that agent p has power over agent d due to reason
r. We call agent d the depender, and agent p the performer of the dependence.
Example 1 illustrates that an agent may depend on several other agents for the same
reason, known as OR-dependence, meaning that she can choose one of these agents to
make an agreement.
Example 1. Consider the abstract dependence network visualized in Figure 2.a. As
common in this literature, a dependence of d on p for r is visualized by an arrow from
d to p labeled with r. For example, if the reasons represent resources, then the flow of
resources is inverse to the direction of the arrows. Dependence (b, a, r1) may be read
as “agent b depends on the Amazon service a to receive a book,” (b, f, r1) as “agent b
depends on the FNAC service f to receive a book,” and (a, b, r2) as “the Amazon ser-
vice a depends on agent b to receive a payment in exchange of the book.” The reason r1
can be a goal of the agent b to receive the book, or a task of Amazon or FNAC to send
the book, or the book can be a resource. Summarizing, the agent can receive the book
either from Amazon or from FNAC, but it is not able to pay FNAC for its services, only
Amazon.
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Fig. 2. A proposal is a dependence relation.
2.2 Proposals
We associate sets of proposals for agreements with dependence networks. A proposal
for an agreement is a dependence relation, and a proposal function is a function from
abstract dependence networks to sets of proposals. Dependence (d, p, r) proposes a
commitment of the performer p to act in the benefit of the depender d to fulfill a goal,
perform a task, or provide a resource.
Definition 2 (Proposal function). Let N = 〈S,R,D〉 be an abstract dependence net-
work. A proposal P ⊆ D for N is a dependence relation. A proposal function p is a
function from abstract dependence networks to sets of proposals p(〈S,R,D〉) ⊆ 2D.
Note the similarity between our proposal function and Dung’s argumentation se-
mantics [16], which we explain in Section 3.2. Argumentation semantics associate sets
of nodes with a graph, we associate sets of edges with a (labeled) graph. In this sense,
we may say that the proposal function gives semantics to the dependence networks.
Example 2 illustrates the difference between a dependence as part of a network,
and a dependence as part of a proposal. Being part of a network does not imply a
commitment of the agents to act according to the dependence.
Example 2 (Continued). Figures 2.b and 2.c visualize proposals P1 and P2, respec-
tively. Note that the dependence network is visualized as a straight box, and proposals
with a dashed box. Figure 2.b visualizes a proposal where Amazon commits to send
the book and agent b commits to pay for it, and Figure 2.c visualises a proposal where
FNAC commits to send the book, but agent b does not commit to pay for it. A pro-
posal function p may return multiple proposals, such as p(N) = {P1, P2}, on which
the agents can argue.
A sub-proposal is a subset of a dependence relation.
Definition 3 (Sub-proposal). A proposal P1 is a sub-proposal of proposal P2 if and
only if P1 ⊆ P2.
Example 3 illustrates a proposal with two sub-proposals.
Example 3. Consider the proposals visualized in Figure 3. Proposal P1 has two sub-
proposals P2 and P3. The agent b depends on Amazon to receive the book, but the
payment is either via PayPal or via a credit card company, or both. Dependence (p, b, r3)
may be read as “PayPal p depends on agent b to confirm purchase of the book,” and
(c, b, r6) as “credit card company c depends on agent b to enter billing and shipping
information.” The agents may argue which of P1, P2 or P3 is a better proposal.
3 Arguing about proposals
The first challenge is how to define the attack relation over proposals. It encodes dom-
inance or preference over proposals, and from arguing about preferences by Visser et
al. [32] it is known that such an attack relation may be acyclic and transitive, questioning
the use of argumentation theory as a mechanism to decide conflicts among proposals.
3.1 Agent behaviour
For the individual agents, we use a standard cost-benefit analysis. Each dependence
comes with a cost for the performer, and a benefit for the depender, which are positive
real numbers. The payoff for an agent is the sum of the benefits of each reason where he
depends, minus the sum of the costs of the reasons where he performs. An investigation
into uncertainty, utility, and the dependence among reasons, are left for future research.
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Fig. 3. Two sub-proposals P2 and P3 of P1.
Definition 4 (Cost-benefit). Cost and benefit functions c, b : A × R → IR+ are func-
tions from agents and reasons to positive real numbers. The reasons where agent a has
a benefit, written as benefits(a, P ), are {r | p ∈ A, r ∈ R, (a, p, r) ∈ P} and the rea-
sons where he has a cost, written as costs(a, P ), are {r | d ∈ A, r ∈ R, (d, a, r) ∈ P}
The payoff of a proposal P for agent a, written as pay-off(a, P ), is
Σr∈benefits(a, P )b(a, r)−Σr∈costs(a, P )c(a, r)
For modeling the interaction among the agents, we use a standard definition from
game theory [23]. A proposal P1 dominates a proposal P2 if and only if for all agents
involved in P1, the pay-off in P1 is at least as good as in P2, and for at least one of them
it is strictly better. The restriction to agents of P1 is crucial: there may be agents who
are worse off in P2, but since these agents do not play a role in P1, they cannot argue
against it. Furthermore, there is no double counting for one and the same reason.
Definition 5 (Dominance). Let the agents of a proposal P be A(P ) = {a ∈ A :
∃(d, a, r) ∈ P or ∃(a, p, r) ∈ P}. A proposal P1 dominates proposal P2 if and only
if we have ∀a ∈ A(P ) : payoff(a, P1) ≥ payoff(a, P2) and in addition ∃a ∈ A(P ) :
payoff(a, P1) > payoff(a, P2).
Dominance is not strong enough to reject a proposal, as several proposals can be
accepted at the same time. We introduce now an attack relation among proposals such
that a proposal attacks another proposal when accepting the former implies that the
latter is not acceptable. Moreover, we say that a proposal attacks itself if the payoff for
at least one of the agents is negative.
Definition 6 (Attack). A proposal P1 attacks another proposal P2, written as P1 ↪→
P2, if and only if P1 dominates P1 ∪ P2, or P1 = P2 and the payoff of at least one of
the agents is negative.
Example 4 illustrates that the attack relation is not acyclic, and not necessarily tran-
sitive.
Example 4 (Continued from Example 2). Consider the abstract dependence network
visualized in Figure 4, where agent b is able to pay for the FNAC service as well as for
Amazon. This leads to two proposals P1 and P2 attacking each other.
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Fig. 4. Attack cycle: P1 attacks P2 and vice versa.
3.2 Acceptable proposals
To define acceptable proposals, we introduce the basic concepts of Dung’s abstract
argumentation [16].
Definition 7 (Argumentation semantics). A proposal argumentation framework (AF)
is a pair 〈P, ↪→〉 where P is a set of proposals called arguments and ↪→⊆ P ×P is the
binary attack relation over proposals. Let C ⊆ P . A set C is conflict-free if and only if
there exist no Pi, Pj ∈ C such that Pi ↪→ Pj . A set C defends an argument Pi if and
only if for each argument Pj ∈ P if Pj attacks Pi then there exists Pk ∈ C such that
Pk attacks Pj . Let C be a conflict-free set of arguments, and let D : 2P 7→ 2P be the
function such that D(C) = {P |C defends P}.
– C is admissible if and only if C ⊆ D(C).
– C is a complete extension if and only if C = D(C).
– C is a grounded extension if and only if it is the smallest (with respect to set inclu-
sion) complete extension.
– C is a preferred extension if and only if it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
admissible extension.
– C is a stable extension if and only if it is a preferred extension that attacks all
arguments in P \ C.
Dung’s theory offers the choice among several alternatives to define when an indi-
vidual argument is acceptable. First we have to choose a semantics, then we have to
choose whether the argument must be in the union or intersection of the extensions of
this semantics. We say that an argument is acceptable if it is in the union of all admis-
sible sets (which is the same as being in the union of the complete extensions, or the
union of the preferred extensions).
Definition 8 (Acceptable proposal). A proposal is acceptable, if and only if it is in
some admissible set.
The following example illustrates that there may be multiple extensions.
Example 5 (Continued from Example 4). Reconsider the abstract dependence network
visualised in Figure 4. Since there are four dependence relations, there are sixteen pro-
posals. P1 and P2 attack each other, and each other proposal containing at most two
relations attacks itself. Moreover, P1 and P2 attack all proposals containing three or
four relations. Consequently, only the empty proposal, P1 and P2 are acceptable.
P1 and P2 (Figure 4) consist of cycles, and do not contain multiple dependence
relations for the same reason. In the remainder of this section, we show that this holds
in general.
A proposal is exchange-based (or transaction-based) if every dependence is part of
a cycle. This represents the fact that cooperation is based on reciprocity, called also
do-ut-des [28].
Definition 9 (Exchanged-based proposal). A cycle is a sequence of dependencies
(s1, t1, d1), . . . , (sn, tn, dn) such that ti = si+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and tn = s1.
A proposal P ⊆ D is exchange-based if and only if there is a set of cycles C such that
P = ∪C.
Example 6 (Continued from Example 2). ProposalP1 visualized in Figure 2.b is exchange-
based, but proposal P2 visualized in Figure 2.c is not.
Lemma 1. If P1 attacks P2 and P1 is a sub-proposal of P2, then P1 is not acceptable.
Proposition 1. If a proposal is acceptable, then it is exchange-based.
Proof. (sketch) We prove the contrapositive. In an exchange-based proposal, each
agent involved in a dependence performs something for another agent and depends
on another agent. If a proposal is not exchange based, then there are two cases. First,
it contains at least one agent who does not depend on another agent, but performs
something for another agent. The payoff of this agent is negative, and the proposal
therefore attacks itself. So it is not acceptable. Second, it contains an agent that de-
pends on another agent, but does not perform something. This agent can be removed
from the proposal, improving everyone else’s payoff. So the proposal is attacked by a
sub-proposal. It follows from Lemma 1 that the proposal is not part of an admissible
set, and therefore it is not acceptable.
If a reason occurs more than once in an abstract dependence network, it represents
an OR-dependence. If it occurs more than once in a proposal, the proposal is redundant.
Definition 10 (Non-redundant proposal). Proposal P ⊆ D is non-redundant if and
only if each reason occurs at most once.
Proposition 2. If a proposal is acceptable, then it is non-redundant.
Proof. (sketch) If a proposal is redundant, then it can be split in sub-proposals where
one of the sub-proposals strictly dominates the original proposal for the agents involved
in the sub-proposal. The result follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 3. If a proposal is exchange-based and non-redundant, then there are cost
and benefit functions such that the proposal is acceptable.
Proof. (sketch) Let there be n dependence relations in the abstract dependence net-
work. Let the benefit of all dependencies be 1, let the cost of all dependencies in the
proposal be 1/(n + 1), and the cost of all other dependencies be n. The payoff of the
exchange-based proposal is positive for the agents involved in it.
3.3 Minimal proposals
In this section, we define a suitable notion of minimal proposal. For example, if propos-
als consist of sub-proposals of disconnected components, then the agents can negotiate
the sub-proposals one at a time. However, the following example illustrates that we
cannot restrict ourselves only to simple cycles.
Example 7. The benefit for agent a in Figure 2 of r4 or r5 individually may be smaller
than the cost of r1. For agent a only proposal P1 is acceptable, and P2 or P3 are not.
Definition 11 (Minimal proposal). A proposal P is minimal if and only if it cannot
be partitioned into two or more disjoint proposals P = P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pn, such that P is
acceptable if and only if for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: Pi is acceptable.
The following proposition shows that if a proposal is minimal, then it cannot be split
into two sub-proposals sharing at most one agent. Sauro [28] calls this the indecompos-
able do-ut-des property, abbreviated to i-dud.
Proposition 4. If proposal P is minimal, then there are no disjoint nonempty proposals
P1 and P2 such that P = P1 ∪ P2 and P1 and P2 share at most one agent.
Proof. (sketch) We prove the contrapositive. If P1 or P2 is not acceptable, then P1∪P2
is not acceptable. This follows from Lemma 1.
Example 8. Figure 5 visualizes an abstract dependence network and four acceptable
proposals, P1 to P4. P3 is a non-minimal proposal since it is acceptable only if P1 ∧P2
are acceptable. Proposal P4 attacks proposal P3, and we have that the attack from P4
to P3 leads to an attack from P4 against P2, which is a sub-proposal of P3. Agent b
is able to pay Amazon services to receive the book. The payment is made via PayPal.
Dependence (p, l, r7) may be read as “ PayPal p depends on the linked debit card l to
verify the account information” and (l, a, r8) as “the linked debit card l depends on the
Amazon services a to publish correct prices.”
Proposition 5. If P is a proposal such that there are no disjoint nonempty proposals
P1 and P2 such that P = P1 ∪ P2 and P1 and P2 share at most one agent, then there
are cost and benefit functions such that P is minimal.
Proof. (sketch) Let all costs be 1, and let all benefits be the in degree of the node
plus 0.5.
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Fig. 5. The non-minimal proposal P3.
4 Qualitative dependence theory
In this section we consider the case in which we do not know the cost and benefit
functions, and we consider a more qualitative version of the dependence theory. We
define preferred, complete and grounded proposals, not to be confused with preferred,
complete and grounded sets of proposals defined in the argumentation theory.
4.1 ∃-acceptable proposals
A proposal is called ∃-acceptable if it is acceptable for some cost and benefit functions,
i.e. if it is exchange-based and non-redundant.
Definition 12 (∃-acceptable proposal). A proposal P is ∃-acceptable if and only if it
is non-redundant and exchange-based.
4.2 Preferred proposals
We define a preferred proposal as a proposal that obtains the maximal exchange. In
other words, a preferred proposal is a maximal – with respect to set inclusion – ∃-
acceptable proposal.
Definition 13 (Preferred proposal). A proposal P is preferred if and only if it is max-
imal (with respect to set inclusion) among the ∃-acceptable proposals.
The following example illustrates preferred proposals.
Example 9 (Continued). The dependence network visualized in Figure 3 contains three
∃-acceptable proposals, P1, P2 and P3. Only P1 is preferred.
It is straightforward to find preferred proposals of an abstract dependence network:
– While there are reasons occurring more than once in the proposal, remove one of
them non-deterministically.
– While there are agents who perform but who do not depend on other agents, remove
all dependence relations where these agents perform.
Proposition 6. The intersection of preferred proposals does not have to be ∃-acceptable.
Proof. Consider the example visualized in Figure 6. There are two preferred proposals
P2 and P3, and their intersection P4 is not exchange-based.
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Fig. 6. Two preferred proposals P2, P3 and intersection P4.
Proposition 7. There exists at least one preferred proposal.
4.3 Complete, grounded and stable proposals
Based on the notion of redundancy, we have a notion of conflict: two ∃-acceptable
proposals conflict if their union is not an ∃-acceptable proposal.
Definition 14 (Uncontested proposal). Two ∃-acceptable proposals P1 and P2 con-
flict if P1 ∪ P2 is not ∃-acceptable. An uncontested proposal is a proposal which does
not conflict with another proposal.
Proposition 8. Two ∃-acceptable proposals conflict if they contain two distinct depen-
dences with the same reason.
The following example illustrates a contested proposal, i.e., a proposal conflicting
with another proposal.
Example 10 (continued). Consider the dependence network visualized in Figure 3. It
contains two contested proposals P1 and P2.
An uncontested proposal is a proposal which does not conflict with all the other pro-
posals. Based on the notion of uncontested proposal, we define complete and grounded
proposals.
Definition 15 (Complete proposal). A complete proposal contains at least all the un-
contested proposals.
Proposition 9. A preferred proposal is also a complete proposal.
Definition 16 (Grounded proposal). A grounded proposal contains precisely the un-
contested proposals.
Example 11 (continued). Consider again Figure 4. We have the following complete
proposals: P1, P2, and the empty proposal, i.e., if agents do not do anything. The only
uncontested proposal is the empty set, because proposals P1 and P2 conflict. Therefore,
the grounded proposal is the empty set.
Proposition 10. There is a unique grounded proposal.
Definition 17 (Stable proposal). A stable proposal is a preferred proposal conflicting
with all the other proposals.
5 Related research
Emerson [18] was the first to introduce the theory of dependence in sociology, and
Castelfranchi [13] popularized it in distributed artificial intelligence, and later in multi-
agent systems, by exploiting the notion of social power.
In coalition formation, Sauro [27, 28] uses dependence networks to ensure that a
coalition is effectively formed only when all its members agree on it, and they cannot
deviate from what was established in the agreement. He introduces the do-ut-des and
indecomposable do-ut-des property as primitives, whereas we derive it from the def-
inition of minimality. While we use OR-dependence only, he uses also the notion of
AND-dependence.
Other papers like the following couple coalition formation and the theory of de-
pendence. Sichman [30], for instance, uses dependence networks to allow the agents to
evaluate the susceptibility of other agents to adopt their goals. Grossi and Turrini [19]
show how dependence-theoretic notions like cycles are amenable to a game-theoretic
characterization. Finally, Bonzon et al. [9] and Sauro and Villata [29] use dependence
networks in cooperative boolean games [17] to improve the computation of the pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium and the core, respectively. Our work is orthogonal to this
game theory research, as we consider arguing about agreements. In particular, we go
beyond the use of dependence networks in coalition formation by introducing Dung’s
theory of abstract argumentation as reasoning technique to guide the agents in arguing
during the process for reaching agreements.
Several papers propose to use argumentation theory to reason over the formation
of coalitions of agents. Among them, Amgoud [1] uses a preference-based argumen-
tation framework to represent coalition formation such that the preferred solutions to
coalitional games are defined as preferred extensions of the corresponding argumenta-
tion framework. There are several differences with respect to this approach. In partic-
ular, the internal structure of coalitions is not specified in [1] as they are considered
as abstract elements while here we represent their internal structure using dependence
networks which provide us a kind of explanation about why two coalitions cannot be
formed at the same time going beyond preferences as in [1]. Bulling et al. [11] present
a generalization of Dung’s theory, extended with a preference relation, such that ATL
is used for reasoning about the behavior and abilities of the agents, and Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex [15] define coalitions of arguments to reason over the acceptabil-
ity of meta-arguments in the meta-level, and Bonzon et al. [8] translate argumentation
frameworks into cooperative boolean games to compute preferred extensions using the
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we go beyond such a combination of
argumentation theory and coalition formation techniques by introducing the theory of
dependence which allows us to compute dependence-based agreements.
The work proposed by Boella et al. [7] combines argumentation theory, coali-
tion formation, and dependence networks. They introduce a so called stability meta-
argument which attacks one of these two attacks, preferring in this way one coalition
over the other. A first difference is that they rely on dynamic dependence networks [12]
where also higher-order dependencies are considered, while here we use standard de-
pendence networks. The abstract theory proposed in this paper goes beyond the basic
conflicts among coalitions considered by Boella et al. [7] introducing further constraints
on the acceptability of proposals.
6 Summary and outlook
Our theory of arguing about dependence consists of two phases. In a first phase, propos-
als for agreement are selected from a dependence network. In a second phase, agents
argue about the proposals using reasons—goals, tasks and resources—associated with
the dependence relations to order the proposals. Dung’s semantics [16] determines ac-
ceptable proposals not dominated by other proposals.
The do-ut-des and indecomposable do-ut-des properties are derived from first prin-
ciples, in the sense that argumentation provides the foundations for concepts such as
redundancy, acceptability and minimality. We show that acceptable proposals are ex-
change based and non-redundant, and we show that minimal proposals cannot be split
into nonempty sub-proposals sharing at most one agent. In addition, we show that if a
proposal is exchange based and non-redundant, then there are cost and benefit functions
such that the proposal is acceptable, and if a proposal cannot be split into several sub-
proposals sharing at most one agent, then there are cost and benefit functions such that
the proposal is minimal. This forms the basis for a more qualitative dependence theory
based on ∃-acceptability.
One may wonder whether, instead of discarding them, it would not be useful to keep
several redundant dependencies in the same proposal for the argumentation or negotia-
tion process. However, as is shown in the argumentation phase, redundant dependence
relations are represented by distinct proposals on which the agents argue. Thus, we do
not discard them, both proposals for distinct performers will be used in the argumenta-
tion phase.
There are more insights from argumentation theory that can be used in the proposal
phase. In particular, an important reason for the popularity of Dung’s abstract theory
is that it can be applied to non-monotonic reasoning by instantiating the abstract argu-
ments with logical formulas [26], along the same lines as we have instantiated them
with proposals for agreements. Moreover, Dung shows how his theory can be applied
also to reasoning about games. Likewise, we can instantiate the abstract reasons with
logical formulas representing goals, abilities, tasks and resources.
We made several assumptions in this paper to facilitate the presentation. Here we
sketch their relaxation. First, we can introduce AND-dependences as defined by Sauro
in [27], while retaining the results. Sauro defines cycles incorporating AND-dependence
as going through one of the AND alternatives. Second, we can allow distinct perform-
ers for the same reason. To make the results hold again, we need to add additional
assumptions. For example, if there are dependence relations with respect to the same
reason with two distinct dependers and performers, then other dependence relations ex-
ist among them too: if (d1, p1, r), (d2, p2, r) ∈ D, then also (d1, p2, r), (d2, p1, r) ∈ D.
Third, we can provide a cost-benefit analysis not depending on simple addition of costs
and benefits. If we have a monotonicity property that more dependence increases bene-
fits and more performance increases costs, then the results still hold.
We believe the combination of proposing agreements and arguing about propos-
als can be best understood from a dialogue perspective. Abstract argumentation theory
as proposed by Dung is not very well suited for dialogue, since agents are abstracted
away. It is more about inference from inconsistent knowledge bases than about merging
knowledge bases [2], whereas dialogue is better seen as a generalization of merging
knowledge bases. Moreover, most dialogue theories agree on the fact that arguments
are proposed in some order. This seems a useful idea to incorporate in our theory. The
question is, where does the order of proposing agreements come from? We may assume
an ordering on dependencies (based on an ordering on the reasons) which gives us this
ordering. Argumentation, and in particular negotiation, is based on preference (and in-
directly, utility and probability). Finally, though we use argumentation, negotiation is
an alternative model to come to an agreement [24].
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